Supposing that mental states are realized in the cerebrum, and that the playing out of their functional roles is constituted by a series of neural events in the cerebrum involving their physical realizers, it follows from the account I have sketched that if a cerebrum is transplanted from one body to another, without its internal operations being disrupted, and if it is connected appropriately to the new body, there will be a psychologically continuous series connecting the mental life of the cerebrum donor and that of the cerebrum recipient, and the recipient will be the same person as the donor. It is of course an empirical questionwhether in fact a cerebrum transplant would result in such psychological continuity; among other things, it is an empirical question to what extent mental states are realized in the cerebrum. The neo-Lockean view is not committed to any claim about this empirical issue—it is committed only to the conditional claim that if transplanting a cerebrum would result in such psychological continuity, then the cerebrum recipient and the cerebrum donor would be the same (SHOEMAKER, Sydney. Persons, animals, and identity. Synthese. 2008).
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